Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 21 | Issue 2

Article 3

5-1-2007

The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Housing
Authorities: Can You Say That Here?
Martin J. Rooney

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Housing Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Martin J. Rooney, The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Housing Authorities: Can You Say That Here?, 21 BYU J. Pub. L. 323 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol21/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Housing
Authorities: Can You Say That Here?
Martin J. Rooney∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Although a public housing development may look like a typical
neighborhood or even a small town, they are in fact unique government
properties. As such unique issues relating to freedom of expression arise.
In two cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has applied the so-called public forum doctrine under the First
Amendment and has upheld the power of public housing authorities to
control what was said and when it was said on their properties.1
However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took exception
with those holdings and found that a housing authority’s attempt to limit
the speech rights of persons on its premises violated the First
Amendment – essentially engaging in a direct attack on the analysis of
the Eleventh Circuit and that court’s careful review of the nature of the
property and its intended uses.2 Other courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have become involved with the issue.3
This article will review briefly the status of the public forum line of
cases under the First Amendment, and then consider these conflicting
decisions with a view to the public policy issues raised by this interesting
question of the free speech rights of subsidized housing tenants. While it
is true that under the classic public forum line of analysis the government
can often restrict or prohibit speech on property it owns and operates,
where that public property is the homes of poor families or the elderly
and appears to be a typical neighborhood, a different answer could be
necessary, as the Massachusetts court so held.4
I will suggest, however, that the Massachusetts court has
misinterpreted federal law and reached an incorrect conclusion. A careful
∗

Shareholder, Curley & Curley, P.C, Boston, Mass. B.A, University of New Hampshire
(1979); J.D. Boston College Law School (1982).
1. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994); Crowder v. Hous. Auth.
Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1993).
2. Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 n.10 (Mass. 1997).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See Walker, 677 N.E.2d at 1128.
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and considered review of all the facts relating to the property and its use,
and not just of the facial appearance of the property, should be required
under modern public forum case law analysis. Such analysis balances the
needs and responsibilities of the government as property owner with the
constitutional rights of tenants and others who use the property. The
government acting as landlord with respect to its own property, rather
than as sovereign with respect to others’ property, needs to be accorded
more leeway with regard to restrictions on expression than it would
otherwise possess.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Public Housing Authorities
Federal statutes create a funding mechanism by which local entities
are able to buy, build, and operate various housing programs for the
poor.5 The local housing authority takes this money, perhaps together
with state or local funds,6 and creates apartment buildings. These
buildings, ranging from high rises in massive complexes to small
townhouses in the country,7 are made available by the government to
families and elderly or disabled individuals who meet the various
regulations governing tenant selection.8 In most respects, these public
housing authority developments resemble privately-owned housing and
are, of course, the homes of the residents of those developments.
B. The Government’s Right to Control First Amendment Activities on
Property it Owns: The Public Forum Doctrine
Beginning with Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association,9 the United States Supreme Court has handed
down a series of cases10 implementing a tripartite analysis of claims
involving First Amendment challenges to restrictions on the use of
government-owned property for speech activities. In doing so, the Court
has established what has become known as the public forum analysis.11
5. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§1437–1441 (2005).
6. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, esp. §§ 8–16, 26–40 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Walker, 677 N.E.2d at 1126 n.2.
8. 24 C.F.R. pt. 960 (2006) (tenant admission and occupancy regulations); 760 MASS. CODE
REGS. 5.00 (2005).
9. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
10. See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text.
11. CHEMERINSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 11.4.2.1 at p.1085
(2d ed. 2002).
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This analytic methodology is designed to “strike[] [a] balance between
the public’s right of access to public property for expressive activity and
the government’s interest in limiting the property’s use based on the
character of the property at issue.”12
In Perry, a school district granted the teachers’ union, as part of a
collective bargaining agreement, the exclusive right to access the
interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes within that system.13 A
rival union challenged this practice, seeking similar access.14 The Court
found that there was no violation of the First Amendment.15 In its
reasoning, the Court recognized three different categories of publicly
owned property, or public fora: (1) “traditional” or “quintessentially
public” fora, (2) limited public fora, and (3) non-public fora.16 A
traditional public forum is one that “by long tradition or by government
fiat [has] been devoted to assembly and debate.”17 A limited public
forum is one that is “generally open to the public even if [the government
entity] was not required to create the forum in the first place.”18 A nonpublic forum is one that “is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication.”19 This analysis followed from the fact that the
government in this type of case is not acting as a sovereign attempting to
control activities on property owned by others, but as a proprietor of
property: “[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.”20
In a public forum, the government landowner may limit speech and
impose content-based exclusions from the forum only upon a showing of
a “compelling state interest” and upon a showing that the limitations and
exclusions are “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”21 Further, contentneutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of expression are
permissible only when they are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest” and the regulations “leave open ample alternative

12. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1323 (1st Cir. 1993)
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 44).
13. 460 U.S. at 40.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id. at 44–46.
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 46. See also id. at 47 (“[S]elective access does not transform government property
into a public forum.”).
20. Id. at 46 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21. Id. at 45.
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channels of communication.”22 In a limited public forum, the government
is bound by the same rules as in the general all purpose public forum.23
However, the government may limit the purpose of the forum, that is,
limit the forum’s use to certain groups only, or for expression on certain
subjects only.24
In non-public fora, the rules are different. The First Amendment does
not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled
by the government.”25 In addition to time, place, and manner restrictions,
the government may “reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”26
In sum, where the government has fully dedicated property it owns
and controls to expressive use, only the most limited and important
interests support preventing expressive activities in that forum. In limited
public fora, a particular range of expressions are allowed, subject to
those same stringent constraints on restricting speech. But in non-public
fora, outright bans on speech can be imposed based merely on a
reasonable relation between the restriction and the nature of the
property.27
Applying this framework, in Perry the Court found that the internal
mail facility at the school was not a public forum and therefore could be
reserved for the use of the union that represented all teachers in the city.
Access by a competing union not officially representing the entire body
of teachers was not required.28 As the Court summed,

22. Id.
23. Id. at 46.
24. Id. at 46 n.7. For example, the forum can be reserved for student groups at the school,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), or for discussion of school board business only, Madison
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
25. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citation omitted).
27. As stated by the Perry Court,
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions may be
impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of
limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the
property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable
in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.
Id. at 49.
28. Id. at 53 (“But the internal mail system is not a public forum. As we have already
stressed, when government property is not dedicated to open communication the government may—
without further justification—restrict use to those who participate in the forum’s official business.”).
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When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State may not
pick and choose. Conversely on government property that has not been
made a public forum, not all speech is equally situated, and the State
may draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose for which the
property is used. As we have explained above, for a school mail
facility, the difference in status between the exclusive bargaining
representative and its rival is such a distinction.29

After Perry, the Supreme Court applied its decisional framework in a
number of cases. The Court struck down a statute prohibiting picketing
on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building, finding
that the sidewalks were the type of government-owned property
historically dedicated to unlimited free speech.30 Accordingly, the
sidewalks were public fora where the government could not ban
picketing without a compelling state interest.31 However, a time
limitation on the use of public parks was upheld despite the park’s nature
as a public forum.32 The limitation was a reasonable “time, place, or
manner” restriction that was content neutral, left open other avenues of
communication, and was designed to support the government’s interest
in the use of public parks.33 The Supreme Court has also held that a city
may ban the posting of signs on public property for the aesthetic and
economic interests of eliminating clutter and visual blight.34 Street light
posts, for example, are not a type of property historically dedicated to
public communication and thus are not a public forum.35
In determining whether the government property in question is or is
not a public forum, the governmental owner’s intent—including the
government’s original, historical intent, i.e., tradition—is a key factor. In
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,36 the
Supreme Court found that a charity campaign, conducted on federal
property, was not a public forum.37 The intent of the charity campaign
was not to provide a forum for expressive activities, but rather to allow a
limited group to solicit a specific type of contribution; therefore there
was no purposeful designation of the charity drive for general public
29. Id. at 55.
30. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983).
31. Id. at 179–80, 183.
32. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
33. Id. at 298-99.
34. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
35. Id. at 814–15.
36. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
37. Id. at 801 (“We agree with respondents that the relevant forum for our purposes is the
CFC [Combined Federal Campaign].”).
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use.38 Restrictions on the number and type of charities allowed to
participate and the length of the messages were proper under the lower
reasonableness standard applied to non-public fora.39 The Court noted
that it will not reach to find a public forum “in the face of clear evidence
of a contrary intent, nor will [it] infer that the government intended to
create a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with
expressive activity.”40
Thus, even in what might at first blush appear to be a location by
tradition dedicated to communication activities that is therefore a public
forum, the Court will find even this location to be a non-public forum if
its unique characteristics evince the owner’s intent not to hold it open to
communicative activities. Speech on sidewalks in front of post offices,
for example, can be restricted because clear sidewalks are needed to
insure efficient operation of the mail system. Such a restriction would be
upheld unless it proved to be “‘arbitrary, capricious, or invidious,’” that
is, not reasonable or viewpoint neutral.41 Similarly, publicly-owned
airport terminals were not found to be public fora.42 Rather, the Court
found that the government had not dedicated this type of property to
expressive use from time immemorial.43 As the terminals were not public
fora, the Court upheld the ban on solicitations as a reasonable restriction
on the use of the property.44 However, the majority45 went on to find that

38. Id. at 788–806.
39. Id. The court elaborated in this fashion:
The Government’s decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. . . . Nor
is there a requirement that the restriction be narrowly tailored or the Government’ interest
to be compelling. . . .
The reasonableness of the Government’s restriction of access to a nonpublic forum
must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding
circumstances.
Id. at 808–09.
40. Id. at 803. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has stated, “[T]hese cases suggest
that courts should hinge their analyses largely on whether the government intended that the property
become a designated public forum.” AIDS Action Comm., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994).
41. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725–34 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974)) (plurality opinion); see also Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (explaining that sidewalks on government reservation not public fora).
42. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
43. Id. at 679–81.
44. Id. at 683–85.
45. The Court upheld the solicitation ban on a 5–4 split with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas forming the majority. Id. at 685. The
Court struck down the literature ban with a 5–4 split with Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice
O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter forming the majority. Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) (per curiam). Justice O’Conner filed a concurring
opinion explaining her swing vote. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
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an outright ban on the free distribution of literature on the property was
not reasonable, as such distribution presented few problems other than
perhaps litter.46
Even in a location that by tradition and intent is a public forum—a
polling place—certain government imposed restrictions may still be
upheld.47 The Court has upheld a regulation that banned all political
speech—but only political speech—within the 100-foot area surrounding
the entrance of a polling place.48 Though this is without doubt a contentbased restriction, the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is
sufficiently narrowly tailored.49 As will be seen in the next section, this is
an unusual result.
Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently used a tripartite analysis of
examining whether the location is a public, limited public or non-public
forum to determine when the government may restrict expression on
property it owns. In non-public locations, so long as the restrictions
remain reasonable and viewpoint neutral, they will typically be upheld.
C. The Government’s Right to Control First Amendment Activities in
Public Fora or on Property It Does Not Own
While governmental efforts to restrict speech activities in non-public
fora have been routinely upheld, similar efforts in public fora or limited
public fora have just as routinely been met without success. In Lovell v.
City of Griffin50 and its progeny, the Court addressed the right of
municipalities to restrict speech activities on their streets and sidewalks.
Such efforts have generally been doomed to failure because common
public streets and sidewalks have been the quintessential public fora for
the exercise of free speech rights since the beginning of our nation’s
history:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of

685 (1992) (O’Conner, J., concurring in judgment).
46. Lee, 505 U.S. at 831; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 690.
47. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
48. Id. at 193–94, 211 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 197–99, 209–11. Justice Scalia found that the area in issue was not a “traditional
public forum,” as polling places had traditionally not been public fora. Id. at 214–16 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). Therefore the regulation was a reasonable regulation of a nonpublic forum.
Id.
50. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.51

In Martin v. Struthers the Court employed similar reasoning to reject the
constitutionality of a regulation banning door-to-door solicitation within
the City of Struthers, Ohio.52 Again speaking in sweeping language, the
Court noted:
For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries
for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock
on doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or to
invite them to political, religious, or other kinds of public meetings.
Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to
depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and
not upon the determination of the community. In the instant case, the
City of Struthers, Ohio, has attempted to make this decision for all its
inhabitants.53

Content-related partial bans on the use of the streets and sidewalks
for expressive activity have had a hard row to hoe to pass constitutional
muster. Ordinances that prohibit picketing on a public way within a set
distance of a school, except for peaceable labor picketing, have failed to

51. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
52. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
53. Id. at 141. The court explained the rationale for this view:
While door to door distributors of literature may be either a nuisance or a blind for
criminal activities, they may also be useful members of society engaged in the
dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free discussion. . . .
“Pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And
perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their
distribution at the homes of the people.”
Id. at 145 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)); see also Jameson v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (“[O]ne who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the
public carries with him . . . [the] right to express his views in an orderly fashion.”) (ban on orderly
distribution of religious leaflets on public streets violated First Amendment); Loper v. N.Y. City
Police Dep’t., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (prohibiting statutory ban on all begging and soliciting on
streets despite concerns about fraud, intimidation, coercion, harassment, and other criminal conduct).
The court added, again in broad brush strokes,
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so
clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and
health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The
dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to
each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.
Martin, 319 U.S. at 146–47.
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get over the constitutional hurdle.54 A regulation that banned only certain
types of news racks on sidewalks in Cincinnati was not permissible, as it
was a content-based restriction relating to commercial speech and was
not a valid time, place or manner restriction.55 Similarly, a regulation that
banned charitable solicitations on a door-to-door basis unless at least
seventy-five percent of the receipts were used for charitable purposes
was struck down as violative of the First Amendment.56 Such results can
even be found in a case involving non-publicly owned streets or
sidewalks, but streets in a privately-owned town. The outright ban on the
distribution of religious literature on privately-owned sidewalks and
streets in a “company town,” which in all significant respects were
identical to public town sidewalks and streets, has been held to violate
the First Amendment.57 The Supreme Court also struck down a total ban
by a school district on using district property for religious purposes, as
such a ban was not viewpoint-neutral.58
Under the public/limited public/non-public forum analysis, the
Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to uphold restrictions
imposed by the government as sovereign on property that is either a
traditional public forum or on property owned by others. The next
question is how the courts have applied this line of analysis to the unique
issue of publicly owned housing.

54. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1943). The court stated:
But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. . . .
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say.
Id. at 95–96.
55. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (1993).
56. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980); see also
Bellotti v. Telco Comm’ns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1986).
57. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the property where the ban on the
distribution of religious literature had occurred,
ha[d] all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of
residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, [and] a sewage disposal plant . . . . A
deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town’s
policeman. . . . The town and the surrounding neighborhood . . . cannot be distinguished
from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines . . . .
Id. at 502–03; see also id. 509 (striking down the ban on distribution within the company town, the
Court stated that “the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment ‘lies at the
foundation of free government by free men.’” (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939))).
58. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (reviewing public forum doctrine).
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III. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO PUBLIC HOUSING
AUTHORITIES
A. Initial United States Supreme Court Attention to Governmentally
Owned Housing and the First Amendment: Tucker v. Texas
The United States Supreme Court has on one occasion addressed the
specific situation where a public housing authority (or at least what was
called a housing authority) attempted to restrict speech on its property. In
Tucker v. Texas,59 the Supreme Court addressed an appeal from the
County Court of Medina, Texas in which Tucker had been convicted of
what was essentially trespass after notice.60 Tucker was a Jehovah’s
Witness engaged in the distribution of religious literature to “willing
recipients.”61 The locale of his activities was the Hondo Navigation
Village.62 Owned by the Federal Government, the village was
constructed under congressional authority to create housing for workers
engaged in national military services during the World War II time
period and was apparently under the administration of the Federal Public
Housing Authority.63 The Court noted that “[a]ccording to all indications
the village was freely accessible, open to the public, and had the
characteristics of a typical American town.”64 The village manager
ordered Tucker to discontinue his religious activities on the premises,
and when Tucker refused his arrest followed.65
The Court held that there was no principled difference between the
case at bar and the Marsh66 company town case, the negligible difference
between the two cases simply being that instead of a private corporation
owning the town, the federal government owned the town.67 “This
difference [did] not affect the result.”68 The Court held, some thirty years
prior to the Perry decision, that “neither Congress nor federal agencies
acting pursuant to congressional authorization may abridge the freedom
59. 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
60. Id. at 518.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 518–19.
64. Id. The manager testified at trial that a regulation promulgated by the Washington D.C.
office gave him full authority to regulate the conduct of those living in the village, and that he did
not allow preaching without a permit issued in his discretion. Id. at 519.
65. Id. at 519 n.1 (upholding the state court’s decision that the manager had the authority
noted, but stating in a footnote that there was no such regulation it could find in its research).
66. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. Tucker, 326 U.S. at 520.
68. Id.
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of press and religion safeguarded by the First Amendment.”69 Thus, in
the first housing authority case to come before the Supreme Court, long
before the development of the public forum doctrine, the Court struck
down the regulation of speech when grounded merely in the
government’s ownership of public housing.
B. The Federal Circuits Address the Issue of When a Public Housing
Authority May Regulate First Amendment Expressive Activities on its
Property
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the problem
In Crowder v. Housing Authority70 and Daniel v. Tampa, Florida,71
the Eleventh Circuit had cases before it arising out of public housing
authorities’ attempts to control the use of their property for certain
expressive activities. In Crowder, a tenant attempted to hold Bible study
meetings in the common facility of the apartment building he lived in,
which was owned by the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA).72 Crowder
wanted to use both the building’s auditorium and its library.73 After some
complaints, Crowder’s activities were initially forbidden; then, a tenant
vote was held on whether and when to permit the meetings, resulting in
Crowder being restricted to holding his activities on Friday nights only.74
When Crowder attempted to hold a meeting at another time, he was
arrested for “violation of a lawful order to leave.”75
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the public
forum doctrine under Perry.76 It held that the auditorium was a limited
public forum, as it was opened by the AHA for a “wide range of
expressive activities,” including religious services.77 The library was
found to be a non-public forum, as it was at best irregularly and
infrequently used by the tenants for any type of meeting.78 Given the
nature of the property, the circuit court held that the initial complete ban
on all meetings run by Crowder was not reasonable and was not a valid

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
(1983)).
77.
78.

Id.
990 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1993).
38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
990 F.2d at 589.
Id.
Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590–91 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37
Id. at 591.
Id.
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time, place, or manner restriction.79 Likewise, the court held that the
tenant majority vote requirement was an improper content-based decision
prohibited by the First Amendment.80 The circuit court held that the
adoption of the Friday night restriction was also improper.81 Even if this
restriction was assumed to be content-neutral, to be proper it had to be a
time, place, or manner restriction that was narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest under Supreme Court precedent.82
“Because the facilities were not in constant use during the daytime, the
Friday-night-only rule was not narrowly tailored to serve the substantial
government interest in avoiding scheduling conflicts.”83 Finally,
addressing the specific arrest of Crowder, the court held that since the
library was a non-public forum, and was being used at the time of the
arrest to temporarily store furniture, the management’s actions were
“reasonable and lawful” on that date.84
A year later, the Eleventh Circuit returned to this problem in the
Daniel case,85 which began when Daniel sought a preliminary injunction
from the federal district court.86 Daniel was a member of a black rights
organization who wished to engage in door-to-door political expression
within two Tampa Housing Authority (THA) developments.87 The
developments had a history of serious drug and crime problems—
particularly crime caused by non-residents—that led the THA to create a
policy barring anyone from being on the property who was not
specifically “authorized, licensed, or invited.”88 Daniel challenged the
policy as being overbroad and a violation of his and other tenants’ First
Amendment rights.89 The district court, upholding the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, issued the preliminary injunction.90 The district court
relied upon Martin v. Struthers91 as creating a right in the homeowner to

79. Id. at 592.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 593.
82. Id. at 592.
83. Id. at 593.
84. Id. Even if the court assumed that the library was a limited public forum, the court would
find that the use of the library by others pursuant to a first come, first serve basis to avoid scheduling
conflicts was a permissible content-neutral restriction on the use of the forum, and such a policy
would withstand strict scrutiny review. Id.
85. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 818 F. Supp. 1491 (M.D. Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Daniel I].
86. Id. at 1491.
87. Id. at 1492–93.
88. Id. at 1492 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 810.09 (1989)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1494. The court enjoined the THA from arresting Daniel for trespass while engaged
in door-to-door political expression at reasonable times on the various THA properties.
91. 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
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decide whether or not to receive distributors of literature.92 Thus, Daniel
had shown a likelihood of success on the merits, warranting the issuance
of an injunction.93 This was despite the fact that both the magistrate and
the district court held that the THA property was a non-public forum.94
Daniel’s success was short-lived. When the case went to trial on the
merits, the THA prevailed before a different district court judge.95 The
district court decision begins by noting that it is far from clear that the
forum analysis is applicable in the first instance, as Daniel’s physical
presence on the property, which was the root cause of his arrest for
trespassing, was in and of itself not expressive conduct, and thus could
be considered to not involve any First Amendment issue at all.96
Assuming Daniel’s claim could be construed as involving expressive
activities, the court held that the property of the THA was “neither a
traditional public forum nor a designated [(or limited)] public forum.”97
The purpose of the THA’s property was to be the private residences of
low income individuals, “not for the public exposition of ideas,” and thus
was not a limited forum.98 The court contrasted the property with
traditional forums, such as public streets and parks, noting that the THA
had never allowed activities such as solicitation, canvassing or the
distribution of literature on its property.99 Accordingly, the property was
a non-public forum100 and the restrictive policy “easily” met the
requirement that it be reasonable and not content-based, and thus
withstood constitutional scrutiny.101 The court therefore entered
judgment as a matter of law for the city at the conclusion of the
plaintiff’s case.102
92. Daniel I, 818 F. Supp. at 1493.
93. Id. at 1493–94.
94. Id. at 1494. The court rejected, however, Daniel’s argument that he had a First
Amendment right to distribute his materials and engage in expressive conduct on other common area
portions of the THA’s property apart the actual apartment entrances. Id. The court similarly rejected
the void for vagueness claim. Id.
95. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 843 F. Supp. 1445 (M.D. Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Daniel
II].
96. Id. at 1447.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court also noted that the lack of a formal written policy forbidding such activities
was not the equivalent of a designation allowing such activities. Id.
101. Id. at 1447–48.
102. Id. at 1448. The court wrote:
Simply put, the public’s compelling interest in keeping out dangerous drug dealers and
addicts far outweighs Daniel’s desire to post fliers or leaflets on Housing Authority
property. Daniel is provided an alternative public forum only yards away [(the city
streets)], which he has used extensively and without incident in the past. To the extent
that the enforcement of the trespass statute constitutes a time, place, or manner
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Not surprisingly, the case went up on appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The circuit court103 reviewed and applied the
public forum doctrine, affirmed the district court’s decision and agreed
that the property at issue was a non-public forum.104 The court noted in
support of this determination that the housing authority’s mission “is to
provide safe housing for its residents” and that access to the property is
controlled and limited to “residents, their invited guests, and those
conducting official business.”105 The court held that the access
restrictions were content-neutral and were a reasonable means of
combating crime within the Authority’s property.106 Accordingly, the
restrictions passed constitutional muster.107 The Eleventh Circuit has thus
spoken twice on the issue of the proper analysis of freedom of expression
issues on public housing authority property and has correctly applied the
Supreme Court’s tripartite public forum analysis.
2. The Fifth Circuit’s approach
The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the problem of analyzing the
freedom of expression rights of individuals on public housing authority
property. In Vasquez v. Housing Authority, first the District Court for the
Western District of Texas108 and then a panel of the Fifth Circuit109 dealt
with a First Amendment challenge to a no-trespass regulation adopted by
the Housing Authority of the City of El Paso (HACEP). The district

restriction, it is a slight one, and in any event amply justified.
Id. The court went on to reject the overbreadth challenge, finding that the First Amendment impact
of the trespassing policy was not substantial “[w]hen ‘judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate
sweep,’” and thus not overbroad. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
Interestingly, although the decision in Daniel II came down seven months after Crowder, the district
court did not cite to the Crowder decision.
103. Daniel v. Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Daniel].
104. Id. at 550.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Daniel had argued that Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), controlled the
decision of the case. The circuit disagreed:
The [Supreme] Court’s opinion in Martin rests upon the premise that a city may not
“substitute the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual
householder,” and divest the homeowner of the decision of whether to speak with the
canvasser. This concern is not implicated where, as here, the regulated property is
government-owned.
Daniel, 38 F.3d at 549 n.7 (internal citation omitted).
108. Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 103 F. Supp. 2d 927 (W.D. Tex. 2000) [hereinafter Vasquez I],
rev’d, 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh’g granted, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
109. Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh’g granted, 289
F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
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court upheld the regulation.110 Factually the case closely resembled the
Massachusetts Walker case.111 Vasquez was a non-resident who wanted
to go door-to-door within an HACEP development to campaign for a
county office.112 The development was a typical housing development
bounded by public streets, with some public streets running through the
development.113 The HACEP allowed residents and certain “legitimate”
non-residents on the property to go door-to-door, but otherwise denied
access to the property.114 Vasquez was denied the right to go door-todoor campaigning, and a resident—de la O—alleged he was denied the
right to receive such campaigning.115 The district court began with a
review of the Supreme Court public forum case law and particularly
noted the Eleventh Circuit’s Daniel decision.116 The court rapidly found
that the development was a non-public forum.117 Accordingly, the court
turned to the issue of whether or not the regulations were reasonable.118
The court found that the regulations passed muster after noting that the
regulations combated crime, that there was ready access to city streets,
that tenants could specifically invite campaigners into the property, and
that the regulations were content-neutral.119
The matter was appealed to the Fifth Circuit.120 The majority opinion
110. Vasquez, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 932–33.
111. Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125 (Mass. 1997).
112. Vasquez, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
113. Id. at 929 n. 1.
114. Id. at 929 n. 2.
115. Id. at 929–30.
116. Id. at 932–33 (citing Daniel v. Tampa, Fla, 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994)).
117. Id. at 933 (“the [c]ourt pauses only momentarily to conclude that HACEP’s complexes
are ‘non-public forums’”).
118. Id.
119. Id. In a related case, the same district court judge reached the same conclusions as in this
matter. In De La O v. Housing Authority, the court had before it essentially an identical claim as in
Vasquez, with the exception of there not being a plaintiff who was an actual political candidate. 316
F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 417 F.3d 495 (5th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 808 (2005). The court again found that the HACEP properties were
non-public fora and that the restrictions imposed by the Authority were both viewpoint-neutral and
reasonable, and accordingly passed First Amendment muster. Id. at 487. The court also rejected an
overbreadth challenge to the restrictions, finding that the Authority rules did not tread upon any
expression or associational rights. Id. at 488. Further, the district court rejected an equal protection
challenge, finding no constitutionally protected category of individuals to be involved and that the
restrictions were rationally related to the goals of the HACEP. Id. at 488–89. An appeal followed.
See De La O v. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 808 (2005); See
also infra notes 136-149 and accompanying text.
120. Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198 (2001) [hereinafter Vasquez II], vacated and reh’g
granted, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002) (granting petition for rehearing en banc). Apparently, de la O
died before the Fifth Circuit could issue an en banc opinion and the appeal was dismissed as moot.
See De La O, 417 F.3d at 498 (“The [Vasquez] case, however, was voted en banc, and after briefing
and argument had concluded, de la O died. Because Vasquez had not filed an appeal, the absence of
a living plaintiff rendered the case moot, and it was dismissed.”).
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also began by repeating the now familiar outline of the Supreme Court’s
forum analysis.121 The majority quickly agreed that the HACEP
developments were non-public fora.122 The key factors in this decision
were that residency was limited to a certain class of people, that there
were generally no public streets or parks within the developments, that
the developments were created for the purpose of providing affordable
housing to those with low income, and that the government did not create
the housing to provide a public meeting place.123 As the majority held,
“This [purpose] necessarily mandates a finding that the HACEP
developments differ in character from the areas previously categorized
by the Court as designated public fora.”124
Despite finding that the HACEP developments were non-public fora,
the court went on to find that the HACEP regulations were not
reasonable and thus did not pass even minimum rationality review.125
While the regulations were viewpoint-neutral, the regulations were not
reasonable under the circumstances.126 The court agreed that safety and
crime prevention were legitimate purposes for the regulations.127
However, the developments resembled private neighborhoods in the city,
and residents were permitted under the regulations to campaign and
distribute literature on a door-to-door basis, subject to identification,
prior permission, and time restrictions.128 Additionally, certain guests
were permitted to enter.129 In light of these facts, the court stated, “We
are persuaded beyond peradventure that the wholesale exclusion of
political candidates and their volunteers from this category [of those
permitted access to the property] unreasonably and unnecessarily
interferes with what may well be the primary connection between many
of the HACEP’s residents and the democratic process.”130
The dissent pointed out that, under Cornelius131 and other Supreme
Court case law, the regulations merely needed to be reasonable, not the
“most reasonable or [the] only reasonable limitation.”132 The dissent
121. Vasquez II, 271 F.3d at 202.
122. Id. at 202–03.
123. Id. at 202.
124. Id. at 202–03.
125. Id. at 203.
126. Id. at 203–04.
127. Id. at 204.
128. Id. at 204 & n.22.
129. Id. at 205.
130. Id. (noting that “requiring political campaigners to seek the same authorization as other
individuals” allowed on the property for legitimate business would be reasonable in light of the goals
of crime prevention).
131. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
132. Vasquez II, 271 F.3d at 207 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
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would have found the differentiation made by the HACEP based on the
identity of the speaker reasonable and therefore would have upheld the
regulations.133
Following the issuance of this opinion, the Fifth Circuit granted a
request for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion.134
Subsequently the named plaintiff died, leading to the appeal being
dismissed as moot prior to en banc reconsideration of the issue.135
The Fifth Circuit did eventually return to this issue in the related case
of De La O v. Housing Authority.136 The De La O case was brought by
the widow of one of the plaintiffs—de la O—from the Vasquez case.137
After the HACEP prevailed in the district court on the same basis as it
had previously done so,138 this second appeal followed. While appeal to
the Fifth Circuit was pending, the HACEP amended its regulations to
allow non-residents to go door-to-door for political or religious activities
within its developments.139
The Fifth Circuit rejected a mootness challenge made in light of the
amendments and began its constitutional analysis by noting that the
plaintiff, a non-campaigning resident, had the same First Amendment
protections as a receiver of information as the actual campaigners would
possess.140 The court then toured the landscape of the public forum
doctrine and noted that public housing developments “have repeatedly
been held to constitute non-public fora.”141 Noting that the HACEP’s
primary purpose was to house needy individuals and families and not to
provide a facility for the expression of ideas or a meeting place for the
populace, the court held that “it [was] obvious, therefore, that for
purposes of our further analysis, HACEP’s facilities [were] non-public
fora.”142
808 (emphasis added)).
133. Id. at 209.
134. Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
135. See De La O v. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
808 (2005) (“The [Vasquez] case, however, was voted en banc, and after briefing and argument has
concluded, de la O died. Because Vasquez had not filed an appeal, the absence of a living plaintiff
rendered the case moot, and it was dismissed.”).
136. 417 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 808 (2005).
137. Id. at 498; see supra notes 108-135.
138. See De La O v. Hous. Auth, 316 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486–87 (W.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 417 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 808 (2005).
139. De La O, 417 F.3d at 498.
140. Id. at 499–500, 502; see also Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1127
(Mass. 1997).
141. De La O, 417 F.3d at 502, 503 (text and n. 13). Interestingly, the court did not cite the
Walker decision, which held that the housing development area there in dispute was a public forum.
See Walker, 677 N.E.2d at 1128.
142. De La O, 417 F.3d at 503–04.
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Addressing the issue of whether the revised regulations passed
constitutional muster, the circuit held that it was beyond question that the
regulations were content-neutral and thus passed scrutiny if they were
reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.143 The HACEP’s interest
in crime prevention was obviously weighty, there were multiple
alternative channels of communication, and the burden on the plaintiffs
to use those alternative channels was minimal.144 The regulations were
constitutionally valid.145
Turning to the problem of the original regulations, the Fifth Circuit
noted that its prior panel in Vasquez had found the regulations an
unreasonable restriction, even for a non-public forum.146 However, this
panel did not adopt that position. The panel did note that these prior
regulations presented a “closer question,” but held that “in light of the
overriding need to provide safe housing, they are constitutional.”147 The
panel went on to address an issue not previously discussed: whether the
requirement that the HACEP must pre-approve the content of any flyer
or handout violated the First Amendment.148 Finding it “undeniable” that
viewpoint restrictions on content would violate the Constitution, the case
was remanded for the district court to make findings on that specific
issue.149
The federal courts of appeal seem to be quite consistent in their
approach to the problem of restrictions on freedom of expression on
property owned by public housing authorities; however, as the next
section will show, Massachusetts has taken a noticeably different tack.
C. The Massachusetts Contrary Approach to the Problem
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of
freedom of expression on public housing authority property in Walker v.
Georgetown Housing Authority.150 The plaintiff—Walker—was a tenant
of the Georgetown Housing Authority (GHA) who challenged the ban
imposed by the GHA on door-to-door campaigning and soliciting within
a development for the elderly.151 The trial court granted summary
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 507–08.
677 N.E.2d 1125 (Mass. 1997). The author was counsel for the Housing Authority in this

case.
151. Id. at 1126.
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judgment to the tenant under both the Federal Constitution and
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, finding that the policy violated the
free speech rights of the tenant.152
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the decision of the
trial court under both the First Amendment and the state constitution.153
The court began by noting that a similar ban on all door-to-door
canvassing imposed by a municipality would not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.154 The court then stated, “[w]e reject the authority’s claim that
its streets and sidewalks and the doorways of its apartment buildings are
not areas to which the same rights [(as exist with respect to a
municipality)] apply.”155 The court relied heavily on the 1943 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Martin v. Struthers for this position, and
rejected the GHA’s position that the streets and sidewalks of its
development were a non-public forum.156 The court declined to adopt the
public forum doctrine as a decisional tool under the state constitution.157
Addressing the federal claim, the court immediately found that the streets
and sidewalks “fall squarely within the classification of a public
forum.”158
The authority is a public entity. Its property is publicly owned. There is
no apparent distinction between its streets and sidewalks and those of a
private development. A technical distinction that its ways are not
accepted public ways but rather appear to be private ways open to the
public makes no difference. The constitutional right of the authority’s
tenants to receive communications may not be abridged by the blanket
prohibition of campaigning and solicitation.159

Rather than carefully looking at the intent of the government entity
with regard to the use of the property (as more modern federal precedent

152. Id. at 1126–27.
153. Id. at 1127.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1127–28. The court quoted from Martin with approval:
For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for persons not
specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to
communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to political, religious, or other kinds
of public meetings. Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed
to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the
determination of the community.
Id. at 1127 (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141 (1943)).
157. Id. at 1128.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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such as Perry and Cornelius required), the Massachusetts court took a
somewhat formalistic approach to the issue—if it looks like an ordinary
city street or a sidewalk, it is a public forum.160 It would appear that short
of perhaps creating gated communities with check points, or similar
frank differentiation from the surrounding streets, the Massachusetts
court would not find housing authority streets and sidewalks to be
anything other than prototypic public fora, regardless of the intent of the
housing authority.161 Public ownership with a facial similarity to typical
streets led to the conclusion that the area was a prototypic public
forum.162 No specific evidence was cited by the Supreme Judicial Court
that the housing property had been the type of property historically
reserved and used for expressive purposes, other than its observation that
the streets and sidewalks looked like municipal streets and sidewalks. In
reaching its conclusion, the Massachusetts court directly attacked the
reasoning and position of the Eleventh Circuit—and perhaps by
inference that of the United States Supreme Court—stating,
[T]he reasoning of the court in the Daniel case is questionable. It seems
that, because the authority had limited access to its property, the court
concluded that the property was not a public forum. The proper
question, it seems to us, was whether the authority had a right to limit
access in the first place.163

The Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion is a challenge to the core
analytic methodology of the public forum doctrine, as the touchstone of
the public forum analysis is the intent of the governmental entity with
regard to property that it owns—rather than property owned by others.
The Eleventh Circuit looked at the intent of the housing authority and
was chastised by the Massachusetts court for so doing.

160. Id.
161. But see Lancor v. Lebanon Hous. Auth., 760 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1985) (severe
restrictions on access might infringe tenants constitutional and/or statutory rights); McKenna v.
Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981). Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court, in
attempting to distinguish Daniel, stated that the GHA had not offered any public safety justification
for its barring policy. Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 n.10 (Mass.
1997). However, earlier in the opinion the court had noted that the record below showed that the
board adopted the regulation “in response to tenants’ concerns about safety, privacy, and peace and
quiet.” Id. at 1126 n.5.
162. See id. at 1128.
163. Id. at 1128 n.10 (citation omitted).
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D. The Supreme Court Revisits the Issue via the Commonwealth of
Virginia
In 2003, the issue of how to address restrictions on freedom of
expression on public housing authority property percolated its way back
to the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Hicks.164 The case took a long route
to get to the Supreme Court. The first reported decision was out of the
Virginia Court of Appeals in 2000.165 In this initial decision, a panel of
the Court of Appeals addressed a fairly typical factual situation. A
development of the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority
(RRHA) was deeded certain former city streets by the City of
Richmond.166 The RRHA posted “no trespassing” signs on the streets and
gave Hicks a no-trespassing order.167 Hicks was eventually arrested for
violating the order and challenged the constitutionality of the trespass
policy in his criminal trial.168 The policy indicated that non-residents who
were invited to the property or who were there for legitimate business
were not affected by the policy, which further included a process for
lifting a “barment” order barring a person from trespassing on the
property.169 There was also a process for requesting permission to access
the property to distribute flyers or other materials.170
The majority opinion for the Virginia Court of Appeals found that
the policy did not violate the First Amendment.171 Relying upon the
Daniel172 opinion, the majority found, with little discussion, that the
premises were a non-public forum and that the trespass policy was both
reasonable and content-neutral.173 The dissent, however, would have
found that the property was a traditional public forum.174 Echoing the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Walker, the dissent emphasized
that the streets were not gated or barricaded and remained open to all
vehicular traffic and that the sidewalks remained open to all passers-

164. 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
165. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678 (Va. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g granted, 537 S.E.2d
616, (Va. Ct. App. 2000), vacated, 548 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, 563 S.E.2d 674 (Va.
2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
166. Id. at 680.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 680–81.
169. Id. at 681.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 683.
172. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
173. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). The majority went
on to also reject a First Amendment right of association challenge to the trespass policy, as well as a
vagueness or overbreadth challenge. Id. at 683–84.
174. Id. at 685 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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through.175 In light of these facts, the dissent would have held that while
the “grounds and buildings of a public housing development [were] a
‘non-public forum’ designed to provide safe housing for its residents, the
public streets and sidewalks” were a public forum.176 The dissent
distinguished Daniel177 and relied upon the Marsh178 decision to support
its approach.179
Review en banc by the Virginia Court of Appeals followed.180 The
en banc court held that the barment-trespass procedure violated the First
Amendment and reversed the underlying criminal conviction.181 In a sixto-five decision, the majority applied the public forum doctrine to
analyze the matter.182 Again reminiscent of Walker,183 the majority noted
that the “streets and sidewalks surrounding Whitcomb Court did not lose
their public forum status when the City of Richmond deeded them to the
RRHA and put some signs on the street indicating they were now private
property.”184 Accordingly, when the strict scrutiny standard of review
was applied, the no-trespass policy did not pass muster.185
The dissent in the en banc decision would have rejected the
plaintiff’s challenge as an “improper collateral attack on his barment
status.”186 Additionally, the dissent would have found the barment rule
not constitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because its
legitimate overall scope exceeded the scope of any impermissible
application.187 Finally, the dissent would have found that the physical
characteristics of the property were sufficient to establish the area as a
non-public forum and that the restrictions on speech surmounted the
constitutional hurdle by being reasonable, limited, and justified.188

175. Id.
176. Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
177. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
178. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
179. Hicks, 535 S.E.2d at 686–88 (Coleman, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that any
attempt to turn what had been without question a traditional public forum when a city street into a
non-public forum simply failed on these facts. Id.
180. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 548 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Hicks II] (en
banc), aff’d, 563 S.E.2d 674 (Va. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
181. Id. at 256–57.
182. Id. at 253–54.
183. See Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Mass. 1997).
184. Hicks II, 548 S.E.2d at 254. (“Because the streets appear no different from other streets in
Richmond and serve the same function they did prior to ‘privatization,’ ‘we can discern no reason
why they should be treated any differently’ from any other street or sidewalk.” (quoting United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983))).
185. Id. at 256.
186. Id. at 257 (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 259.
188. Id. at 260–61.
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Appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia followed. The Supreme
Court of Virginia reached only the overbreadth argument and, on that
basis, reversed and remanded the matter.189 The court noted that in its
view, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
governmental policies that grant officials “broad and unfettered
discretion to regulate speech” violate the overbreadth doctrine.190 After
review of the factual record, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that the RRHA official—Rogers—did have
unfettered discretion to determine not only who has a right to speak on
the Housing Authority’s property, but she may prohibit speech that she
finds personally distasteful or offensive even though such speech may
be protected by the First Amendment. She may even prohibit speech
that is political or religious in nature. However, a citizen’s First
Amendment rights cannot be predicated upon the unfettered discretion
of a government official.191

The majority specifically noted, but did not consider, the public forum
doctrine arguments raised by the parties and the courts below.192
The dissent in the Virginia Supreme Court would have found that
Hicks did not have standing to raise a facial challenge to the trespass
policy.193 The dissent noted that by its terms, the policy was directed not
at pure speech, but at conduct, i.e., trespassing.194 As such, the dissent
opined that the court should have applied a different standard, that being
“where conduct and not merely speech is involved, . . . the overbreadth
of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”195 A facial challenge
would not lie where the policy was not substantially overbroad in a
relative sense.196 Applying this standard, the dissent found that the policy
was not substantially overbroad, and thus Hicks could not raise a facial
challenge.197
189. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 680–81 (Va. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 113
(2003).
190. Id. at 678 (noting the U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
191. Id. at 681.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 681–83 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 683.
195. Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982)).
196. Id.
197. Id. The dissent went on to note that even a facial challenge should have been analyzed
under the public forum doctrine. Id. at 684. Then the dissent noted that since Hicks was not engaged
in speech or expressive association at the time of his arrest (he was delivering diapers to his child),
the only constitutional right Hicks could raise was that of intimate association. Id. at 684. Visiting

346

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

The matter then reached the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the judgment of the
Virginia Supreme Court, holding that the no-trespass policy was not
constitutionally overbroad.198 The Supreme Court reviewed the factual
history and noted particularly that Hicks was not engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct when he was arrested.199 The Court
began its analysis by narrowly defining the issue before it as the facial
validity of the trespass policy under the overbreadth doctrine.200 In
analyzing the matter, the Court reiterated its overbreadth jurisprudence
and stressed that a law’s application to protected speech under the First
Amendment must be substantial, “not only in an absolute sense, but also
relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applications, before
applying the ‘strong medicine’ of overbreadth invalidation.”201
Applying the rule set out, the Supreme Court noted that the policy—
written and unwritten—did not appear to implicate First Amendment
activities, as the policy in toto included such protected First Amendment
activities within the scope of the provision for entry onto the property for
legitimate business or social purposes.202 Even as applied to entries for
First Amendment covered activities by someone after being barred from
the property, the Court stated that such trespass punishment is directed
not at the protected activity—speech—but the non-protected, nonexpressive conduct of re-entry.203 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that Hicks had failed to show that the trespass policy “prohibits a
‘substantial’ amount of protected speech in relation to its many
legitimate applications.”204 The Court reversed the Virginia Supreme

family members and delivering diapers has not been recognized as a fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 684–85. Therefore, a rational basis test was applied to test the
constitutionality of the application of the policy to Hicks. Id. at 685. The policy here easily met this
rational basis test. Id. at 685.
198. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
199. Id. at 118.
200. Id. at 115.
201. Id. at 119–20 (citation omitted) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613
(1973)). Hicks bore the burden of proving that substantial overbreadth existed. Id. at 122. This
analysis is of course the same analysis applied by the dissent in the Virginia Supreme Court.
202. Id. at 122–23.
203. Id. at 123. (“Punishing [the trespass policy’s] violation by a person who wishes to engage
in free speech no more implicates the First Amendment than would the punishment of a person who
has (pursuant to lawful regulation) been banned from a public park after vandalizing it, and who
ignores the ban in order to take part in a political demonstration. Here, as there, it is Hick’s nonexpressive conduct—his entry in violation of the notice-barment rule—not his speech, for which he
is punished as a trespasser.”).
204. Id. at 124. Indeed, the Court went on to state that “[r]arely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to
conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).” Id.
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Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.205
On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected Hicks’s remaining
First Amendment challenge: that the policy was unconstitutionally
vague.206 Applying well-settled law that a plaintiff may not challenge the
facial vagueness of a law as applied to the conduct of others where he
has engaged in some conduct that is clearly proscribed by law, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that the no-trespass policy could not have
been clearer regarding Hicks’s conduct.207 Accordingly, his vagueness
challenge failed and, after the passage of much time, the trespass
conviction of Mr. Hicks was upheld.208
Throughout the long and torturous trail of the Hicks case the Virginia
appellate courts struggled to apply the public forum doctrine to the
specific facts involving property owned by a unique governmental entity,
the local housing authority in Richmond. Unfortunately, when the Hicks
matter finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court decided the
case under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and did not take
the opportunity to discuss the possible conflicting lines of cases
involving expressive restrictions on unique types of government
property: Marsh, Tucker, and Walker versus Daniel, Crowder, Vasquez,
and Perry. Since the U.S. Supreme Court last dealt specifically with
public housing authority property in the context of restrictions on
freedom of expression in Tucker in 1946,209 additional guidance in this
field would have been welcome.

205. Id. The Court did note that specific applications of the policy that violate the First
Amendment could still be addressed through “as-applied” constitutional challenges, rather than the
“strong medicine” of the overbreadth doctrine. Id.
206. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 596 S.E.2d 74, 78 (Va. 2004).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 77–78, 81. The Virginia Supreme Court went on to also reject Hicks’s Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process challenge based upon the claimed right of intimate association.
Id. at 80. Hicks was claiming a right to visit his child and the child’s mother to deliver diapers. Id. at
79–80. The court concluded that Hicks had failed to prove any such relationship actually existed. Id.
at 80. Further, even if the relationship existed, the no-trespass order did not infringe upon the
relationship as Hicks was free to exercise his associational rights, just not on the property of the
Housing Authority. Id. A review of the issues raised by associational rights challenges to no trespass
orders is beyond the scope of this article.
209. See supra Part III(a).
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IV. PROPER ANALYSIS: BALANCING THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE PARTIES IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING CONTEXT
The public forum doctrine as applied in the public housing context
has received varied academic review, from a frank “advocacy article” on
how to oppose these no-trespass orders,210 to sweeping calls for
legislative reforms,211 to various case reviews.212 Resolving the balance
of the rights and responsibilities of all the parties requires sensitivity to
many different facts and policies.
Essentially every federal court to address this issue has applied the
United States Supreme Court’s modern public forum doctrine without
reservation, while the Virginia appellate courts struggled with this
problem and in Walker v. Georgetown Housing Authority, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts explicitly refused to adopt this doctrine
for use under that state’s constitution.213 In fact, the Massachusetts court
even questioned the validity of this system of analysis under federal case
law, relying instead on much earlier Supreme Court precedent to resolve
the balancing of the particular rights and responsibilities of the varied
parties.214
In this author’s opinion, the proper consideration of cases involving
the regulation of First Amendment expressive activities at a public
housing authority mandates a clear and detailed factual review by the
courts, as required by modern United States Supreme Court precedent
and as applied by the courts of appeal. Critical facts examined in this
review must begin with the intent of the governmental owner and the
specific nature of the premises involved. The Massachusetts court
210. Elena Goldstein, Note, Kept Out: Responding to Public Housing No-Trespass Policies,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 215 (2003).
211. David G. Lazarus, Note, Here Comes the Neighborhood—Virginia v. Hicks and How the
New York Legislature Should Empower Law Enforcement with More Powerful Trespass-Barment
Statutes as a Tool to Combat Crime in Public Housing Projects, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 315
(2004).
212. Gregory A. Beck, Ban Lists: Can Public Housing Authorities Have Unwanted Visitors
Arrested?, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1223; Nancy Soonpaa, Fifth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights Cases, 34
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 597, 606–08 (2003); Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: Ensuring
Neighborhoods a Safer Future by Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
327, 375–384 (2003); Christopher D. Pelliccioni, Comment, Political Speech in the Nonpublic
Forum: Can Public Housing Facilities Limit Access to Political Canvassers?, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 569 (2002); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law: 2 Internet
Filtering As a Condition of Federal Library Funding, 117 HARV. L. REV. 349, 359–369 (2003).
213. 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Mass. 1997) (“We need not decide whether we would find the
Supreme Court’s public, nonpublic, and limited public forum classifications instructive in resolving
free speech rights under our Declaration of Rights.”).
214. Id. at 1128 n.9 (“There is concern about these classifications.”) (citing Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683–85 (1992)); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 993 (2d ed. 1988).
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rejected this approach.215 Relying heavily upon Martin v. Struthers,216 the
Massachusetts Walker court rejected the contention that a public housing
authority’s streets and sidewalks differed at all from the property of any
municipality.217 The Massachusetts court focused almost exclusively on
the fact that the housing authority was a public entity and its streets and
sidewalks appeared facially identical to municipal streets and
sidewalks.218 The Massachusetts court suggested that a public housing
authority should not be able to limit access to such locales at all. The
intent of the government entity—the local housing authority—should not
be material.219 In doing so, the Massachusetts court relied upon the early
U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Tucker220 (government village case)
and Marsh221 (company town case).222 The majority opinion of the
Virginia Court of Appeals in its en banc consideration of the Hicks case
echoed this analysis.223 The Massachusetts court even challenged the
analysis used by the Eleventh Circuit in deciding the Daniel224 case:
[T]he reasoning of the court in the Daniel case is questionable. It seems
that, because the authority had limited access to its property, the court
concluded that the property was not a public forum. The proper
question, it seems to us, was whether the authority had a right to limit
access in the first place.225

Yet, the United States Supreme Court has made clear in more recent
decisions that it is essential, in deciding cases involving the free-speech
use of publicly owned property, to look to the intent of the government
215. See, e. g., supra Part III(b) and (d).
216. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
217. Walker v. Georgetown Hous. Auth., 677 N.E.2d 1125, 1127–28 (Mass. 1997); see also
Hicks v. Commonwealth, 548 S.E.2d 249 (Va. App. Ct. 2001)(en banc majority decision); Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678, 685 (Va. App. Ct. 2000) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1128. Specifically, the court stated,
The authority is a public entity. Its property is publicly owned. There is no apparent
distinction between its streets and sidewalks and those of a private development. A
technical distinction that its ways are not accepted public ways but rather appear to be
private ways open to the public makes no difference. The constitutional right of the
authority’s tenants to receive communications may not be abridged by the blanket
prohibition of campaigning and solicitation.
Id.
219. See id. at 1127–29.
220. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
221. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
222. Walker, 677 N.E.2d at 1128.
223. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 548 S.E.2d 249 (Va. App. Ct. 2001) (en banc); see also Hicks
v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678, 685 (Va. App. Ct. 2000) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
224. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla, 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
225. Walker, 677 N.E.2d at 1128 n.10.
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owner and the historical use of the property.226 Of course, the proper
application of a nuanced, three-part public forum analysis does not
necessarily lead to results where the housing authority universally
prevails. A nuanced public forum analysis best balances the rights and
needs of all the parties by carefully reviewing all factual elements,
including the intent of the governmental entity, the nature of and historic
use of the specific property, and the specific proposed solution.
As the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, courts must keep in
mind that there is a difference between the government acting as
sovereign and the government acting as landowner.227 A governmental
actor acts as sovereign when it regulates individuals as members of the
general populace.228 When the government acts to regulate a specific
piece of its property and those particular individuals who use that
property, it does not act as sovereign but as a unique type of
landowner.229 The modern public forum doctrine applied to public
housing authorities takes into proper account this difference. While a
sidewalk or street owned by a municipality has traditionally been
considered a public forum, the modern public forum doctrine requires a
more detailed analysis when the sidewalk is in a public housing
authority. Because attention must be given to the different nature of the
property and the different intent of the government with regard to the use
of the property, restriction may well be proper on the property of a public
housing authority that no court would continence on “Main Street,
U.S.A.”
As the Crowder,230 Daniel,231 and Vasquez232 opinions indicate, the
circuit courts have not been reluctant to strike down restrictions in non-

226. See supra notes 10-49 and accompanying text.
227. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002) (“But both of these
cases deal with the acts of government as sovereign. In Scales [ v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 224225 (1961)], the United States criminally charged the defendant with knowing membership in an
organization that advocated the overthrow of the United States Government. In [Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v.] Danaher [238 U.S. 482 (1915)], an Arkansas statute forbade
discrimination among customers of a telephone company. The situation in the present cases is
entirely different. The government is not attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate
respondents as members of the general populace. It is instead acting as a landlord of property that it
owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which Congress has
expressly required. Scales and Danaher cast no constitutional doubt on such actions.”).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Crowder v. Hous. Auth., 990 F.2d 586 (1993).
231. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla, 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
232. Vasquez v. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 198, 203–206 (5th Cir. 2001) (The 5th Circuit struck
down the complete ban on political campaigning on the premises of the HACEP as being
unreasonable even in a nonpublic fora, but upheld a registration requirement applied to all
individuals conducting business on the property including campaigners).
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public fora233 where such restrictions are not tailored to meet the
governmental intent and sweep too broadly. As those cases note, a total
ban on campaigning and soliciting, for instance, can certainly be seen as
an unreasonable restriction not tailored to the problem sought to be
addressed by the authority and may not pass even minimal rationality
review.
Indeed a fact specific analysis of restrictions on access to public
housing property for expressive purposes guarantees a more careful and
thoughtful review because the reviewing court must look at the nature of
the property in issue, the problem being addressed, the access requested,
the intended use and the need for access in a historical context. Such
nuanced balancing of conflicting rights and responsibilities contrasts
with Massachusetts’ approach in Walker or the majority opinion in the
Virginia Appeals Court Hicks decision—if it appears to be public and is
owned by a governmental entity, it must be a public forum. Indeed, this
type of per se approach may invite a policy of segregating or gating off
public housing from the neighborhood in which it sits. If one primary
way to achieve non-public forum treatment under the First Amendment
is to erect physical barriers between public housing and its environs,
what impression is being conveyed concerning public housing residents?
How would such barriers conflict with other statutory and constitutional
rights of public housing tenants rights?234
V. CONCLUSION
A careful balancing of the rights of the government entity as property
owner (not as sovereign), the rights of all the tenants (even if those rights
conflict), and the rights of those who seek to pursue First Amendment
activities within a housing development is the most reasonable approach
to dealing with the complex public policy concerns raised by freedom of
expression restrictions within a public housing authority’s property. The
public forum doctrine developed by the Supreme Court since the 1980’s
and subsequently applied by the circuit courts of appeal subsequently in
the context of public housing authorities properly strikes this balance.
The Massachusetts court, and some of the judges of the intermediate
Virginia appellate court, by relying on dated precedent to question the
233. See also Daily v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 221 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (a ban on
religious bible study meetings even in nonpublic or limited public forum—community center—is
neither viewpoint neutral nor reasonable); compare Concerned Residents of Taylor-Wythe v. N.Y.
City Hous. Auth., No. 96 Civ. 2349, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11460 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996) (New
York City Housing Authority’s restrictions reserving the community center, a non-public forum, to
official tenant organizations was valid).
234. See supra note 161.
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validity of this approach, adequately addressed neither the realities of the
unique nature of public housing nor the real differences between the
government acting as sovereign versus landowner. The general history of
the First Amendment shows that the expressive rights protected under its
umbrella are not absolute,235 and the considered approach of the federal
courts under the modern public forum doctrine is the best available
approach for resolving these complicated issues.

235. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNTA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16.1, 16.7, 16.25 (6th ed.
2000).

